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STATES OF CONVERGENCE IN TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE   
Abstract: 
This article engages with questions of policy convergence and divergence in four social-
democratic European regions (Andalucía, Brittany, Wales and Wallonia) in a period of 
economic crisis and ongoing political decentralisation.   It develops an analytical framework, 
WKHµ6WDWHVRI&RQYHUJHQFH¶DVDXVHIXOKHXULVWLFIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLQWHUSOD\EHWZHHQ
convergence and divergence pressures, and processes of territorial adaptation and translation.  
Processes of hard and soft convergence and divergence  operate in distinctive ways 
depending upon whether inputs, outcomes,  processes or institutions are considered.  Hard 
convergence arguments are most convincing in terms of inputs (referring to pressures of 
international ranking and rating, tougher EU budgetary rules, enhanced central steering and 
tighter controls on public expenditure). They are less cogent for understanding outputs, 
institutions and processes.  
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Are States in contemporary Europe driven to enforce new forms of territorial convergence 
under the impact of economic crisis, enhanced European steering and international 
monitoring? This article engages with questions of policy convergence and divergence in a 
period of economic crisis and ongoing political decentralisation.  Debates about convergence 
and divergence are usually framed in relation to the capacity of nation-states to pursue 
distinctive policies. Pressures of hard and soft convergence and divergence also affect the 
styles of and rules governing inter-governmental relations; the institutional, material and 
constructed capacities of sub-national administrations and the reform of regional and local 
service delivery.    
 The principal aim of the article is to contribute to the development of an operational 
analytical framework for framing issues of convergence and divergence at the territorial level 
of analysis. A secondary aim is to apply the framework to four European social-democratic  
regions. The States of Convergence framework is designed to provide a heuristic tool for 
exploring complex processes of convergence and divergence. The cases examined within this 
article are centred on  specific regions within the contemporary European context but the 
processes explored by the framework are by no means limited to the meso-level nor are they 
particularly Europe-specific. Our approach considers subnational spaces, regional spaces in 
particular, as relevant units of analysis for understanding the changes in European political 
systems. The article has a more generic interest insofar as it contributes to reconceptualising 
political change in regional spaces by using empirical research strategies which are both 
comparative and multidimensional.  Such as enterprise is of obvious interest to scholars of 
federalism. The core research questions go beyond state typologies. They concern the impact 
of exogenous and endogenous variables on different models of sub-national governance in a 
period of economic crisis.  The approach adopted is designed to capture broad transnational 
material trends in political economy and regulation, as well as contextually rich accounts of 
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interactions within four comparable European regions. Section one presents the analytical and 
theoretical framework. Section two expounds the core similarities and differences between 
our sample of regions.  Sections three and four consider in turn convergences and 
divergences. The conclusion offers our preferred explanations and raises questions of broader 
significance for students of territorial politics.  
 
THE STATES OF CONVERGENCE: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
7KHµ6WDWHVRI&RQYHUJHQFH¶W\SRORJ\LVSURSRVHGDVWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH
interplay between convergence and divergence pressures, on the one hand, and processes of 
territorial adaptation and translation on the other.  The typology identifies four distinct forms 
of policy convergence and divergence. µ+DUG¶ FRQYHUJHQFH LV µWRS-GRZQ¶ LQ QDWXUH ,W
operates on the basis of clear institutional and policy templates and commitment to 
µGRZQORDG¶WKHVHLWLQYROYHVVSHFLILFFULWHULDLQWUXVLYHPRQitoring and sometimes sanctions 
for non-compliance.  A soft convergence perspective emphasises the exchange of policy 
UHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQEHQFKPDUNLQJµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶RUDWOHDVWFRJQLVDQFHRIRWKHUPRGHOV,Q
our typology, soft (mainly constructed) divergence focuses on a specific form of lesson-
drawing or policy learning whereby organizations and institutions construct themselves 
against perceived negative models.  Our final position is labelled hard divergence, which is 
understood in terms of place specific material, structural, institutional, regional and local 
explanatory factors.  
Our first position is that of hard convergence (Knill, 2005; Pollitt, 2001; Bennett, 
2QHZLGHO\ FLWHGGHILQLWLRQRI FRQYHUJHQFH LV DV µWKH WHQGHQF\RI VRFLHWLHV WRJURZ
PRUHDOLNHWRGHYHORSVLPLODULWLHVLQVWUXFWXUHVSURFHVVHVDQGSHUIRUPDQFHV¶.HUU
Contemporary European States are subject to powerful and potentially converging 
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transnational economic, ideational and institutional pressures, which spillover into their 
management of inter-governmental relations. Different empirical referents of hard 
convergence might encompass fiscal coordination (Dyson, 2014),  technical norms (Borraz, 
2007), policy conditionality, conformity to new trans-national policy instruments (Gilardi, 
2005), respect for formal democratic and market norms by the European Union (EU), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or the external imposition of tough 
performance indicators by these international organisations (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre, 
2010).   What indicators would we use as a proxy of hard convergence? The Europeanisation 
of budgetary policy would provide one reasonable proxy, as would the impact of the post-
2008 economic crisis on local fiscal autonomy. The relationship between economic crisis and 
territorial governance is thus interpreted as a contender for hard convergence, as is a certain 
form of Europeanisation. 
Soft convergence is better captured in terms of institutional mimetism or looser 
pressures towards emulation and policy transfer.  ,Q RXU IUDPHZRUN µVRIW FRQYHUJHQFH¶
involves a more or less conscious effort to import tools or instruments, copy institutions or 
policies or, at a minimum,  refer to a common stock of ideas, or transnational models that 
have demonstrated their worth elsewhere (Rose, 1991; Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000).  How would we confirm a soft convergence hypothesis? The highest level 
of proof would be that of institutional isomorphism (copying institutions), or policy learning 
(copying policies); a weaker, yet probably more realistic, approach is to identify whether 
there are similar perceptions of policy challenges in cognate panels in European regions, 
irrespective of their regional or national context. Evidence is provided later in the article to 
support this second position.  
Two versions of a divergence hypothesis are now presented: the soft (mainly 
constructed) and the hard (material). In our typology, soft divergence focuses on a specific 
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type of cognitive or interactional mechanism whereby organizations and institutions construct 
themselves against perceived negative models. 7KH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI µQHJDWLYH¶ OHVVRQ
drawing is well established in the policy learning literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 
1991; Stone 1999).  How would we confirm a soft divergence hypothesis? Ideally, by 
engaging in longitudinal process tracing over a more or less sustained period of time; and 
LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH UROH RI µRXWVLGHUV¶ LQ VSHFLILF WHUULWRULDO DFWLRQ UHSHUWRLUHV  $QVZHULQJ WKLV
question assumes the capacity to provide longitudinal responses, based on a diachronic mode 
of investigation, favouring thick description on the basis of individual case studies. Such an 
endeavour lies beyond the present exercise, though it has been applied to individual regions 
in our sample elsewhere (Cole and Pasquier, 2015; Cole and Stafford, 2015). Hard 
divergence is understood in terms of the µQRQ-FRPSDUDEOH¶ UHJLRQDO DQG ORFDOLW\ IDFWRUV 
(demographic, geographical, legal, economic, political) that drive or maintain divergence in 
particular places. Policy divergence is driven by these territory-specific factors and  the scope 
of choice available to actors is constrained. Keating (2002, p.13), for example, identified 
:HOVK ODQJXDJH SROLF\ DQG FRPPXQLW\ UHODWLRQV WR EH H[HPSODUV RI µQRQ-FRPSDUDEOH¶
policies within the UK context. 
---Table 1 around here --- 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative theoretical framework. Two main axes can be identified 
in the Table:  convergence and divergence (mainly referring to results, but also involving 
varying degrees of strategic choice); and top down and bottom up (as processes). The four 
SRVLWLRQVLGHQWLILHGLQRXUW\SRORJ\DUHPRUHµVRIW¶RUOHVVµKDUG¶UHFHSWLYHWRKXPDQ
agency. Hard convergence and divergence are best explained by material variables (economic 
indicators, institutional pathways, legal orders, locality factors), which create tensions, 
sometimes evolve in opposing directions and require individual or collective level 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVµ6RIW¶FRQYHUJHQFHDQGGLYHUJHQFHDOORZPRUHURRPIRUKXPDQDJHQF\
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specifically strategic choices and forms of discursive legitimisation.  The two axes are linked 
by an intervening variable that we label as voluntary versus constrained.  The common thread 
between the two axes is the degree to which actors make a voluntary and deliberate decision 
to converge or diverge.  
Processes of hard and soft convergence and divergence are likely to operate in 
distinctive ways depending upon whether inputs, outcomes, processes or institutions are 
considered.  Pressures of international ranking and rating, tougher EU budgetary rules, 
enhanced central steering and tighter controls on public expenditure represent a theoretically 
credible move in the direction of a convergence of inputs, and, more tangentially, outcomes.  
Hard convergence arguments are theoretically less convincing in terms of processes and 
institutions 7KH YDULRXV µQHZ LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPV¶ HPSKDVL]H SDWK GHSHQGHQF\ KLVWRULFDO
logics of appropriateness (sociological) or framing (discursive) as elements of institutional 
endogeneity (Hall and Taylor, 1997, Steinmo, 2008, Schmidt, 2011). Formal process or 
network-based accounts highlight actor-configurations and practices that are unlikely to be 
replicated irrespective of context (Lazega, 2007).  
If it is to take into account the mix of material and constructed elements present 
within the states of convergence framework, the central hypothesis needs to accommodate a 
logic of causality and a logic of contingency.  In a broad-brush manner, a logic of causality 
might take two rather different forms.  In the pure hypothetical deductive tradition of 
variable- based comparisons, convergence and divergence are best understood as results. The 
main analytical challenge is to identify a preferred order amongst several competing 
independent variables that might explain variation. Such an approach is not particularly 
suited to the preferred comparative case study, which requires more interpretative depth and 
which favours  theory building  over formal modelling.   A rather more subtle form of 
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causality is that theorised by Tilly (2001), whereby causal mechanisms  are interpreted in 
terPVRIµSDUWLDOFDXVDOLQVLJKWV¶rather than context averse Covering Laws.  
Both versions of causality can indicate the direction of change. The central hypothesis 
(engaging with the normative Europeanisation and political economy literatures referred to 
above) is that converging pressures, and in particular budgetary retrenchment and the 
requirements of normative Europeanization, have been intensified by the context of the fiscal 
and sovereign debt crisis since 2008. The clear variation in our types of region allows 
institutional and monetary policy differences to be taken into account.  The direction of 
change is one of diminishing territorial capacity. Europeanisation has produced a lessening of 
divergence in legal systems and in the provenance of much public policy and, in most cases, 
has strengthened the instruments of central oversight.  
Contingency is explicitly embraced insofar as process is concerned.  Converging 
pressures do not necessarily produce converging outcomes or outputs (Radaelli, 2005). The 
logic of causality needs to be supplemented by the logic of contingency.  Within their own 
interpretive worlds, territorial actors operate as facilitators of convergence, or prophets of 
divergence. Direct causalities are much more difficult to establish within such a contingent 
approach:  whether regularities exist or not is a manner of sustained empirical investigation 
and comparison.  Herein lies the importance of theorising on the basis of comparable social-
democratic regions. Drilling down, we expect broadly similar challenges to be identified by 
decision-makers in our cognate regions in a period of economic crisis.  
CASE SELECTION 
 
The empirical data underpinning this article is focused mainly on sustained empirical 
investigation of sub-national governments and governance communities in four  social 
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democratic European regions (Andalucía, Brittany, Wales and Wallonia), where data was  
collected over an 18 month period from November 2012 to May 2014.1   These regions share 
many similarities, but are distinguished by one or two key differences, which make them 
appropriate for a most similar research design.   
 These four regions are economically challenged, comprising two old industrial 
regions (Wales and Wallonia) and two traditional agricultural-intensive regions deeply 
affected by the onset of economic crisis since 2008 (Brittany and Andalucía). The poorest 
French region in 1900, Brittany experienced rapid growth rates during the trente glorieuses 
(1945-1975)  and had risen to the 7th or 8th most prosperous French region by the turn of the 
century (Cole, 2006).  By the time of fieldwork in 2013, however, %ULWWDQ\¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH
informal hierarchy of French regions was declining. :DOORQLDZDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\%HOJLXP¶V
heavy industry region; for over three decades it has been engaged in a painful process of 
economic and industrial restructuring, symbolised by the downsizing of the steel industry 
(involving massive lay-offs by Arcelor-Mittal and the closure of one site) and by the 
downturn in the automobile sector (Reid and Musyck, 2010; interviews). Though Wales 
attracted a wave of foreign direct investment in the 1980s and 1990s, the region has suffered 
from the exit of footloose capital (Sony, LG, Toshiba), as well as the painful closure of the 
coal mines and reduction of steel capacity (Pickernell, 2011). $QGDOXFtD¶V economic crisis 
since 2008 has highlighted the impoverishment of households with a GDP per inhabitant 
(17,544 euros) that only reaches 77% of the Spanish average and a very high level of 
unemployment, eight points superior to the Spanish rate (34.6%  (Consejería de Economía, 
Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, 2013).   
Table 2 around here   
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The GDP figures in Table 2 clearly delimit each of our regions as lying below their national 
median. Notional rates of unemployment  varied greatly between our four states : 7.5% in 
Belgium, 7.9% in the UK, 10.3% in France and 25% in Spain (Eurostat, 2012).  Drilling  
down to the regional level, Wallonia (10% overall unemployment) scored far worse than the 
national average, with Hainualt provice (12.1%) on a par with Portugal. Likewise, Wales 
(9.2%) performed less well than the UK average, with pockets of deprivation concentrated in 
the West Wales and the Valleys NUTS region. In Spain, unemployment in Andalucía reached 
34.6%. Only in Brittany (8.4% in 2012) was the regional unemployment rate less marked 
than the national one (10.3%), but the trend was deteriorating.   Educational findings from the 
2012 PISA exercise also identified Wallonia, Wales and Andalucía as laggards, falling 
behind their national performances in Mathematics, Reading and Science (OECD, 2013)2.  
 Third, all four are traditionally pro-European regions, or at least regions benefiting 
from substantial EU investment. Wales has benefited from massive investment through EU 
structural funds; West Wales and the Valleys have had the highest level of assistance for the 
past 3 rounds (2000-2006; 2007-2013 and 2014-2020)3.  Andalucía (responsible for 
approximately one third of the cohesion policy spend in Spain in 2007-2013) was also 
covered by objective one in 2000-2006 and the convergence objective in 2007-2013; it was 
recognised as a transition region for the 2014-2020 period. In Wallonia, the industrial region 
+DLQDXOW¼%REWDLQHGFRQYHUJHQFHstatus (2007-2013); and four Wallon regions in 2014-
2020 were granted transition status (Hainault, Liège, Luxembourg and Namur).  The figures 
were less striking for Brittany, with no specific priority objective since 2000 (Pasquier, 
2012). On the other hanG%ULWWDQ\DV)UDQFH¶VODUJHVWDJULcultural region, has drained a large 
proportion of CAP funds, as well as obtaining µUHWULEXWLRQV¶ in specific sectors such as 
poultry.  
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 All four regions also have ingrained traditions of social-democratic party control. 
Andalucía has been governed by the PSOE-A since the democratic transition in the 1970s, 
and  Brittany has also been a PS stronghold since 2004.  Wales and Wallonia are traditional 
bastions of the Labour Party and the PS respectively.  In each case, the Social democratic 
party sustained a coherent territorial narrative that mixed signifiers from the centre-periphery 
and the left-right axes. Collectively these regions have a distinctive territorial identity, or at 
least a developed sense of regional milieu (Storper, 1995). The µMoreno¶ question, which 
captures the balance of civic and ethnic identities in European regions, has been regularly 
asked in two of our regions, Brittany and Wales.  Wales displays the most sharply divided 
identity in our sample; in the 2009 Citizenship after the Nation-State survey, 40% expressed 
an exclusive (11%) or predominant (29%) Welsh identity, but even the Welsh outlier came 
nowhere near to approaching the SUHGRPLQDQWO\µHWKQLF¶LGHQWLW\GLVSOD\HGLQScotland (60%) 
(Hendersen, 2014).  In Andalucía  and Brittany, there was a clustering towards the median 
position, which accommodates regional and national identities in equal measure.  4  Wallonia  
stands apart somewhat:  the 1999 PIOP survey confirmed a bunching around the median 
position ( as Wallon as Belgian, 41.8%), but a high proportion of  Wallon respondents 
claimed to feel exclusively (22.5%)  or mainly (22%) Belgian (de Winter, 2007).  The 
French-speaking community traditionally looked to the survival of the Belgian state. Faced 
with an increasingly assertive Flemish nationalism,  however, Wallon politicians of all  
parties envisaged (in interviews) a more autonomous Wallonia within a Belgian 
confederation, or even an independent Wallon State.  
Against this background of overarching similarity, the research identified key 
differences that provide insights into the substance of territorial capacity in this family of 
regions.   
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 The institutional configuration is a source of some variation. The four regions exist in 
state types that cover the range of logical possibilities for comparison: a loose federal state 
(Belgium), a hybrid state with some federal characteristics (Spain), a predominantly unitary 
state modified by forms of asymmetrical devolution (United Kingdom) and a decentralised 
but still unitary state (France). As a minimum, each region has a directly elected Assembly.  
These regions have variable degrees of decentralised authority, however,  ranging from full 
µUHVHUYHG¶OHJLVODWLYHSRZHrs in Wales, a specific statute in Andalucía  that confers  a mix of 
primary and subordinate legislative powers on the Autonomous Community and a general 
administrative competency in Brittany (along with a de facto co-decision of EU funding 
decisions). The case is complicated by the institutional mosaic in Wallonia, where regional 
legislative authority is divided between the francophone community (FWB) for matters of 
education and culture, and the Wallon regional council for most other competencies.  
 The EU context provides the core similarity between these regions: all belonging to 
European Union states.  Three of the four regions belong to states that participate in the euro 
and are signed up to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). The 
European variable provides for similarity, but also for variation, insofar as Wales does not 
form part of the Eurozone. 
 )LQDOO\HDFKUHJLRQGLVSOD\VDVSHFWVRIWKHµnon-comparable¶ differences that are the 
core of our fourth position.  The strategies of regional elites, the functioning of the party 
system, the content of territorial narratives and repertoires are each contextually embedded 
and represent place specific divergences. Analytically, notwithstanding their real differences, 
a case might be made for recognising family resemblances between these regions. From a 
territorial politics perspective, we refer to Wales, Andalucía and Wallonia in particular as 
second order strong identity regions because they have had to adapt to the overarching 
presence of a more powerful, autonomist- or independence-minded region  
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within the state (Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders), a presence that has encouraged endogenous 
institutional affirmation5.  From a political economy perspective, Dyson (2014) contends that 
sub-QDWLRQDOVWDWXVDQGSRZHUDUHGHHSO\FRQGLWLRQHGE\µVWDQG-DORQH¶ILVcal capacity;  Wales, 
Wallonia, Andalucía  and Brittany each appear as debtor regions6. Notwithstanding their 
diverse economic trajectories, these regions do not figure very highly up the informal 
hierarchy of European cities and regions.   In the main body of the article, we now present 
comparative findings in relation to the core research questions of convergence, divergence, 
the economic crisis and decentralisation.  
 
CONVERGENCES 
There are two versions of a convergence hypothesis: hard and soft.  The relationship between 
economic crisis and territorial governance is interpreted in this article as a contender for hard 
convergence, as is a certain form of Europeanisation.  Soft convergence, on the other hand, is 
better captured either in terms of institutional isomorphism or looser pressures towards 
emulation and policy transfer. 
Has economic crisis recentralised decentralisation? 
If the hard convergence hypothesis is robust, then broader exogenous fiscal, economic and 
political pressures drive domestic policy change. In extreme cases, such as that of Greece, 
where the Troika (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Central Bank) has intervened directly in domestic institutional arrangements, there 
would appear to be a clear association between externally imposed efforts at state 
retrenchment and domestic policy change (Zahariadis, 2012). More routinely, convergence 
presupposes an increasing oversight by the European Union (EU) into internal budgetary 
affairs, including local government and welfare expenditures.  Across Europe devolved or 
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regional governments are facing enhanced international economic monitoring (embodied by 
WKH UDWLQJV DJHQFLHV (XURSHDQ EXGJHWDU\ VXSHUYLVLRQ WKH µ6L[ SDFN¶ WKH 76CG) and a 
reinvigorated EU-level control over member-states and their sub-state governments. In 
Germany, for instance, demands for greater Länder autonomy from more powerful regions 
have run against countervailing trends of fiscal equalisation, tighter federal controls over 
expenditure and borrowing, central definitions of minimal standards in fields such as 
education and administration and a model of European integration that has challenged 
traditional Land competencies (Benz, 2007; Vetter, 2010). In Spain, the economic crisis has 
produced new budgetary and regulatory controls over the autonomous communities (Sala, 
2013; Colino, 2013). Even in highly decentralised Belgium, the economic crisis has 
empowered the Belgian central bank in its dealing with the regions and communities. 7 
Central Bank officials do not hesitate to check if (and how) the governments of those entities 
comply with the European System of National and Regional Accounts. 
That economic crisis strengthens central government control over regional and local 
government financial circuits is a plausible hypothesis. As central governments are now 
threatened with stiff fines if they do not control the revised budget and debt criteria, 
enshrined in the TSC* WKH\ DUH OHVV ZLOOLQJ WR WROHUDWH µVSHQGWKULIW¶ ORFDO DQG UHJLRQDO
authorities. What does the balance of evidence point to? In France and Spain, the proportion 
of local and regional government expenditure directly transferred by central government 
grants has been rising (usually with forms of hypothecation).  Enhanced centralisation of 
local financial circuits could be observed in France, for example, mainly as the result of a 
major tax reform in 2010 that involved the abolition of the local collection and setting of 
business rates and its replacement by a more centralised formula-based method of tax 
collection (Le Lidec, 2011). President Hollande has not rescinded the measure and has 
frozen, then reduced the overall block grant to local authorities as part of the effort of 
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budgetary rigour. In Spain, though many competencies have been devolved or are shared 
ZLWK FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW  RI WKH DXWRQRPRXV FRPPXQLWLHV¶ ILQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV DUH 
transferred by central government. Investigation in Andalucía revealed a region under 
sustained financial pressure, suffering budgetary cuts from central government, a decreasing 
performance of regional taxes and a drying up of bank loans (Ruíz Almendral, 2013; Simon 
Cosano et al., 2013).  The creation by the Madrid government of the CORA (Comisión para 
la reforma de las Administraciones Públicas ± Commission for the Reform of Public 
Administration) in October 2012 was presented by actors interviewed  as presaging a new 
agency for the budgetary control of the Autonomous communities . Even more than in France 
and Spain, public finance remained a highly centralised policy field within the UK during 
fieldwork; the core block grant mechanism of financing devolution, based on the Barnett 
formula, affords the Welsh government substantial freedom to determine how money is 
spent, but very little autonomy is varying rates of taxation  (Trench, 2013).  
The case of Belgium, finally, represents an opposing trend in terms of public financial 
management; once the sixth reform of the State has been fully implemented, the Federal 
government budget will be limited to servicing the national debt and funding part of social 
security, with many other functions having been regionalised (Deschamps, 2013). To ensure 
the stability of the economic and monetary union of Belgium, the Federal Authority 
maintains its authority for matters of monetary policy, price policy, policy on competition, 
income policy and (part of) social security policy. The one key area where the federal and 
federated units make common cause is in terms of agreeing efforts to be made to reduce the 
debt (interviews, 2014). Retaining credibility as a good European player incited the main 
actors to agree on key measures of budgetary retrenchment; controlling the public debt was 
experienced less as an intolerable constraint than as a gauge of managerial credibility (Beyer 
and Bursens, 2013). 
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Rather more general analysis of the impact of the economic crisis on the decentralised 
and devolved forms of government revealed contrasting findings in our regions. Wales and 
Wallonia, in rather different ways, were tied up with endogenous programmes of state 
reform, and socio-economic issues of economic crisis were given less saliency than in either 
Andalucía   or Brittany.  In Wales, at the time of empirical investigation (November 2012-
July 2013) the Welsh Government had begun a process of streamlining public service 
provision, encouraging collaboration between service providers and introducing timid 
performance management measures, but local government spending on frontline services had 
been sheltered from the worst of the cuts. Welsh political debates were tied up in 
constitutional futures: whatever happened in the Scottish Independence referendum and its 
aftermath would have an impact on Wales. Likewise, the panel in Wallonia (interviewed in 
early 2014), though touched by economic crisis, was preoccupied with implementing the 
sixth state reform programme and deeply anxious about the prospect of further institutional 
and political deadlock after the 2014 federal elections.  The French and Spanish regions, on 
the other hand, were more fully engaged with enduring economic crisis and the effects of the 
economic downturn on the broader territorial model.   
From the above survey, the differences between the regions influenced the way they 
reacted to the economic crisis. Regional reactions were formulated within specific national 
contexts and in line with varying institutional incentive structures (whether to favour 
autonomous regional strategies [Andalucía, Wallonia], for example, or to lobby central 
government [Brittany, Wales]). Regional elites varied in the priority they accorded to fighting 
the economic crisis (Brittany, Andalucía) over promoting (Wales) or resisting (Wallonia) 
further political decentralization.  Our regions each defended particular economic and 
material interests whose existence was threatened by economic crisis (inter alia farming, 
construction and the public sector in Andalucía; farming, telecommunications and the 
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defence industry in Brittany; manufacturing [especially the Steel industry] in Wales and 
Wallonia). However, they adopted contrasting strategies: the direct action and sabotage 
WDFWLFVLQWKHFDVHRIWKHµUHGERQQHW¶SURWHVWVLQ%ULWWDQ\though consistent with an 
established territorial model, were beyond the pale in the other three regions (Cole and 
Pasquier, 2014).    
Converging Europeanisation? An end of the Europe of the Regions?  
The European Union is sometimes presented as the symbol of hard convergence, especially 
by euro-sceptics. In what direction is the relationship between European integration and 
regional governments heading?  Empirical investigation in the field of European integration 
revealed clear differentiation between these traditionally pro-European regions, all key 
beneficiaries in the past of EU structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (Tuñón, 
2010; Cole and Palmer, 2011;  Pasquier, 2012; Beyers and Bursen, 2013).  
The principal cause of variation related, first,  to whether or not a region is within the 
Eurozone and, second, to the degree of influence exercised domestically in relation to 
monetary policy (a highly Europeanised policy domain).  Interlocutors in the euro-zone 
Regions were conscious of operating in the context of a hardening budgetary regime. The 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, agreed in December 2011 and signed in 
2012 by 25 of the then 27 EU member states, strengthened the penalties to be paid by states 
who are unable to control their debt, or to bring into line their budgets to zero deficits by 
2015. µ5HYHUVH 409¶ ZLOO PDNH LW more difficult for states to avoid automatic penalties 
should they prove unable to fulfil the strict Stability Pact criteria8. The TSCG came after a 
significant fiscal and budgetary tightening in the form of the Six Pack and the Two Pack, 
allowing the European Commission, through the European semester process, a much more 
intrusive oversight into national budgets (including making recommendations on member-
16 
 
state budgets before they are presented to national parliaments) 9. The European Semester 
process produces annual reports on the strengths and, more usually, structural weaknesses of 
all EU states (including those, such as the UK and the Czech Republic, not having signed the 
TSCG). The details of these reports filter down into fields such as the housing market, wage 
indexation, pension ages ± the core of traditional economic sovereignty.  Numerous 
competencies dealt with by local and regional authorities are concerned; especially in those 
areas of infrastructure and investment such as road building, urban transport or education that 
required long-term capital investment.  
Interlocutors in our three euro-zone states expressed varying degrees of engagement 
with the European project. In Brittany, interviewees stressed their fundamentally pro-
European sentiment. One of the core novelties of the 2013 round of interviews, however, 
related to disillusion with the European Union as an institution (though not with the European 
LGHDO  7KH µQHR-OLEHUDO¶ (XURSHDQ PRGHO RI WKH %DUURVR &RPPLVVLRQ ZDV FRQWUDVWHG
unfavorably, in interviews, with the traditional Breton model of partnership, cooperation, 
support for public services and direct aids from the French government. In Andalucía, also 
traditionally a strongly pro-European region, fieldwork suggested diminishing enthusiasm for 
the European project. Interviewees regretted diminishing resources from the EU and the 
EXGJHWDU\ FRQVHTXHQFHV RI FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK WKH WURLND¶V GHPDQGV $ERYH DOO WKH 33-led 
government in Madrid was blamed for using the crisis as an argument to recentralise control 
over a number of policy sectors and tighten budgetary steering (Harguindéguy, Pasquier and 
Cole,    2014)   Belgium offered another interesting case of disjunctive Europeanisation.  In 
WKH ZRUGV RI RQH LQWHUORFXWRU %HOJLDQV ZHUH WKH µODVW (XURSHDQV¶ QRZ WKDW HYHQ
neighbouring Netherlands and France had moved in a less pro-European direction. One 
LQWHUYLHZHHEHOLHYHG%HOJLDQVWREHµQDwYH¶KRZHYHUWKH(XURSHDQVHPHVWHUSURFHVVDQGWKH
recommendations made by Brussels to stop indexing salaries with inflation were met with 
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consternation by the Belgian government10. The commitment to zero deficit budgets by 2015 
was proving extremely GLIILFXOWIRU%HOJLXP¶VUHJLRQVFRPPXQLWLHVDQGlocal authorities.  In 
WKH FDVH RI :DOHV ILQDOO\ WKH 8.¶V SRVLWLRQ RXWVLGH RI WKH (XUR]RQH DQG WKH 76CG was 
perceived by interviewees to limit the impact of direct European budgetary supervision.  
There were clear signs of tension with UK premier Cameron and the commitment to hold a 
UHIHUHQGXPLQRQWKH8.¶VIXWXUHPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8 
Even in the Belgian case, fieldwork suggested diminishing enthusiasm for the Europe 
of the Regions.  Against this general conclusion, some distinctions can be drawn, the most 
obvious of which is between: Spain and Belgium, whose regions were at the forefront of 
attempts at budgetary discipline, and Brittany and Wales, somewhat further removed. We 
conclude provisionally that the economic crisis is producing tensions between the EU, central 
governments and this sample of social-democratic  regions. This conclusion invites a 
reinterpretation of the existing literature on territorial governance and Europeanisation.  
Studies of the impact of European integration on regions have typically been articulated in 
the language of multi-level governance, an approach that usually sustains a decentralisation 
narrative in the broader context of Europeanisation (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Piatonni, 
2010). Carter and Pasquier (2010) identify strategic Europeanisation as being one active 
response to European integration that can empower regions in terms of their own identity, 
strategy and networks.   In contrast, Carter and Pasquier (2010) identify normative 
Europeanization  as the process whereby domestic laws and regulations are adapted to 
conform to EU directives and rules. Such top-down Europeanization is typically analysed in 
terms of reception, of adaptation, of goodness of fit, or conforming to European templates 
and best practice (Börzel, 2002; Ladrech, 2010).  The above survey suggests that the 
economic crisis has reduced the space available for strategic Europeanisation and enhanced 
the constraints of normative Europeanisation, experienced by three of our four regions in 
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terms of the constraints of the revised Stability pact, the new budgetary treaty, the new 
European fiscal architecture and the rules of competition policy. Stand-alone fiscal autonomy 
was weakened and traditions of public service delivery and public investment were 
threatened, even in traditionally unconditional Belgium. In these social-democratic regions, 
µQHR-OLEHUDO¶ KDUG FRQYHUJHQFH ZDV H[SHULHQFHG DV D ZHDNHQLQJ RI SROLWLFDO FDSDFLW\ HYHQ
when (in the Belgian and Spanish regions) Brussels was not directly targeted.   
Soft convergence 
,QRXUIUDPHZRUNµVRIW¶ convergence involves a more or less conscious effort to import tools 
or instruments that have demonstrated their worth elsewhere. One indicator of soft 
convergence identified in the literature lies in the diffusion of neo-managerial policy 
instruments, assumed to respond to demands for enhanced efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre, 2010; Hood, 1998). The content of this neo-
managerialist repertoire includes well-known features such as agencification, benchmarking, 
performance indicators, accreditation procedures, management by objectives, programme 
budgeting, one-stop-shops, public-private partnerships and delegation of public missions to 
private entities. These flagship recipes and techniques have repeatedly been broadcasted as 
µEHVW SUDFWLFHV¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG (XURSHDQ IRUXPV DV ZLWQHVVHG IRU H[DPSOH E\ WKH
YDULRXV SURJUDPPHV DQG QHWZRUNV RQ µJRRG JRYHUQDQFH¶ DQG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHIRUPV
handled by the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and the EU (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre, 
2010).  
None of our regions comfortably fitted the NPM model, however. In Brittany, the 
Breton model of cross-partisan consensus was based on negotiated compromises rather than 
binding targets (Pasquier, 2012). In Andalucía, the available evidence suggests that regional 
agencies have been captured by political parties and involve clientelistic politics by other 
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means (Robles-Egea and Aceituno-Montes, 2013). In Wales, new public management  ideas 
of competition, arms-length agencies or the private management of public goods, defined as 
being against the constitutive beliefs of Welsh (and to a lesser degree Scottish) devolution,  
had difficulty in gaining legitimacy (Cole and Stafford, 2014). The strongest case is that of 
Belgium, where policy learning played an important role in the circulation of managerial 
models between Flanders, the Federal Authority and Wallonia, following the Copernicus 
reforms of the 1990s.  In contrast to both Flanders and the Federal Authority, French-type 
legalistic mechanisms initially hampered the introduction of managerial reforms in Wallonia, 
but the French-speaking part of the country has moved gradually towards modernization 
since the decade 2000 as a result of economic investments (the so-called Marshall Plan) and 
EU funding (Brans, de Visscher and Vancoppenolle, 2006; de Visscher and Montuelle, 
2010)11.  In at least three of the four cases, however, there was only limited convergence of 
form; less a case of institutional isomorphism, in short, than one of instrumental 
endogenisation of cross-national fashions. 
Our actor-focussed approach nonetheless facilitated the identification of soft 
convergences between our regions, as gauged in responses to a common question asking 
interlocutors to identify the three principal challenges over the next five year period. Beyond 
regional specificities, five common challenges emerged, irrespective of state type. In order of 
priority, these concerned:  unemployment, and especially youth unemployment; economic 
reconversion and the adaptive capacity of established territorial models; education and the 
levels of basic skills; political decentralisation, its challenges and opportunities, and, finally, 
the preservation of public services.   In each region, there was soul-searching about the 
capacity of existing territorial models to cope with economic crisis, the challenges of 
(industrial and agricultural) reconversion and high unemployment. There was a general 
acceptance that the levers of macro-economic policy escaped the control of regional decision-
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makers. These social-democratic regions all identified the preservation of public services 
(especially health and education) as core to preserving their own territorial model.   
 Our four regions were also compared in terms of a standard question asked of each of 
our interlocutors about models. From this overview, Wales stands out as the exception. In its 
first decade, the policy entrepreneurs driving Welsh devolution developed an original form of 
emulation based on using examples from other Small Country governments to justify policy 
directions and choices, especially in the field of employment, education and training. Early 
\HDUV¶ OHDUQLQJ H[DPSOHV IURP )LQODQG DQG 'HQPDUN IRr example, were specifically 
LGHQWLILHGDVDVRXUFHRILQVSLUDWLRQIRUWKHGHYROYHG:HOVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VHGXFDWLRQSROLF\12 
There was not much evidence of bilateralism making a difference in our other three regions. 
In Andalucía, comparators were within Spain, with few reference points elsewhere.  
Members of the Andalucía panel viewed the Catalans with a mixture of resentment and 
emulation. Several interlocutors expressed their belief that Andalucía   had as strong a claim 
to a more autonomous future as Catalonia. As a poor region on the steps of North Africa, 
however, the prevailing view was that Andalucía did not have the means to consider a future 
outside of Spain. In the case of the French region of Brittany, cross-national policy learning 
was in the main limited to formal relationships, either bilateral Memoranda of Understanding 
(such as with Wales), or relationships mainly in the context of EU programmes.  In the case 
of Belgium, finally, interlocutors identified distinctive styles between the Flemings and the 
Walloons. The francophone community shared a number of prevailing beliefs associated with 
their powerful southern neighbour, France: public service oriented, favourable to state 
economic interventionism, on the centre-left, in quest of a new model based on preserving the 
UHJLRQ¶V LQGXVWULDO OHJDF\ 0DUVKDOO Plan) as well as adapting to new challenges. From the 
francophone perspective, the Flemish community was seen as much more neo-liberal, 
market-friendly, looking to Anglo-Saxon democracies for inspiration. 
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The overview of our four regions thereby provided some evidence of indirect cross-
national learning, but much less evidence of interaction-based learning and agent-based 
policy transfer.   
DIVERGENCES 
Two versions of a divergence hypothesis were presented in the introductory section: the soft 
(mainly constructed) and the (mainly material) hard.   
 Soft divergence, in our typology, is mainly of the constructed variety; actors 
choose to pursue a divergent policy. It focuses on a specific type of cognitive or interactional 
mechanism whereby organizations and institutions define themselves against perceived 
negative models.  One part of our empirical investigation sought to establish whether actors 
reasoned in terms of a territorial model or repertoire (Breton, Welsh, Andalucían, Wallon) as 
comprising a shared set of understandings, practices and identified adversaries13.  In 
Andalucía and Brittany, soft divergence LQLWVµconstructed¶ form) is one dimension of the 
territorial repertoire.  Our survey in Brittany uncovered a tried, tested and challenged 
territorial model that proved its worth in terms of obtaining scarce resources from central 
government, while proclaiming resentment of the µ-DFRELQ¶ORJLFRIFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ (Cole and 
Pasquier, 2015). The Andalucían government also uses identity markers to promote claims in 
Madrid, but the Spanish region was less capable of sustaining a territory wide discourse, 
more tied into traditional partisan and centre-periphery cleavages, low trust and the east-west 
division14. The case of Belgium challenges somewhat the boundaries between the constructed 
and the material as indicators of soft and hard divergence respectively.  In Belgium  
contemporary francophone politics and policies are equally well explained in terms of 
ideational forms of  divergence (specifically the representation of a separatist-minded 
Flanders undermining the Belgium state) as they are by the ongoing reaction to a hard 
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material-based divergence process between the Wallon and Flemish communities with its 
origins in the late 19th century. 
 The first decade of post-devolution Wales illustrated best how such divergence works. 
This mechanism is to be understood both positively, in terms of defining a domestic political 
programme, and negatively, by identifying England as a neo-liberal adversary. In the positive 
frame, interviews with Welsh politicians and civil servants from 2001 to 2010 were replete 
with references to Team Wales, to cooperative modes of public service delivery, to policy 
innovation, to small country governance, to µJHQXLQHO\ MRLQLQJ XS¶ SROLF\ 15. Defining the 
devolutionary project in terms of joined-up public service delivery and against market 
solutions (believed to prevail in England) was a constitutive article of faith for many policy-
makers in Wales (Martin and Webb 2009). In the negative frame, Welsh policy entrepreneurs 
explicitly rejected  English policies in education, orientated around league tables, academies 
and perceived heavy handed inspection regimes and health, specifically the creation of 
foundation hospitals and the purchaser-provider split (Greer, 2007). In the field of public 
services reform, while England  introduced hard edged, top down performance regimes,  
policy makers in :DOHV SUHIHUUHG µSDUWQHUVKLS¶ EHWZHHQ FHQWUDO DQG ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW
(Andrews and Martin, 2010).   The devolved administration in Wales also rejected the 
involvement of private firms and finance in providing and investing in public services, 
refusing the use of the Private Finance Initiatives used extensively in England to build new 
hospitals. There were, arguably, sound political logics to each of these decisions. But were 
officials discouraged from drawing positive policy lessons from English experience under the 
EURDG VWHHU WR GHYHORS µ0DGH LQ :DOHV¶ SROLFLHV"  7KH HYLGHQFH WKRXJK LQFRQFOXVLYH
suggests this to be the case16. Post-devolution Wales provides a critical case which suggests 
that processes of ideational institutionalisation are especially strong at the early phase of 
organisational foundation. 
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In Table 1, hard divergence was identified by the persistence of what Keating (2002) 
labels as the µQRQ-FRPSDUDEOH¶UHJLRQDODQGORFDOLW\IDFWRUVGHPRJUDSKLFJHRJUDSKLFDO
legal, economic, political).  Place-specific contexts (national, regional, local) are key to 
understanding divergence. This contextual relativist position produces two rather different 
levels of analysis: first, the broad brush approach represented by contrasting state clusters and 
regime types; second, drilling down into more precise material, structural, institutional, 
regional and local explanatory factors. 
In their work on sub-national democracy in Europe, Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom 
(2010) identify state traditions as independent variables that are compared across 27 countries 
and mobilised to explain variations in subnational democracy.  Page and Goldsmith (1987) 
provided the classic distinction of northern and southern families of European sub-national 
experience.  They contrasted countries with Napoleonic traditions like France, Spain and 
Italy, with their strong states and weak local government from the functionally stronger local 
governments in states like Sweden and England. In their more recent comparative study,  
Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom (2010)  identify five clusters of states: the British Isles, the 
Rhinelandic states, the Nordic states, the Southern European states and the new democracies.  
In none of our regions, however,  does state form or state type determine trajectories. Three 
of our four states were initially unitary, and/or Napoleonic models (France, Spain, Belgium); 
only the original version, France, has retained sufficient features to be easily recognised as 
coming from a Napoleonic lineage. In the case of Wallonia in particular, and Belgium more 
generally, reference to a state tradition, or even a state type, is not especially helpful. 
Interviewees consistently expressed doubts about the future of the country and recalled the 
artificial nature of the creation of the State itself in 1830, as a buffer state between France and 
the Netherlands.  Likewise, the federal versus non-federal distinction appears rather artificial; 
there is a world of difference between German\¶VQRUPDWLYHO\uniform cooperative 
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IHGHUDOLVPDQG%HOJLXP¶VORRVHFRQIHGHUDWLRQ State traditions and regime types are framed 
at too broad a level of generality that does not adequately capture  the variation demonstrated 
in our cases.  
 More precise material, structural, institutional, regional and local explanatory factors 
are required to enable grounded comparisons.  Hard divergence is given substance by 
material factors.  Two rather different material approaches are pertinent. First, hard 
divergence might be considered as a result, rather than a process.  Divergence is interpreted 
in terms of objective indicators, such as performance in relation to other European regions in 
levels of GDP, investment, productivity, the rate of unemployment or levels of educational 
attainment.  Divergence might be construed as the failure to converge, in spite of two decades 
of national planning and European regional policies. From a macro-economic perspective, 
there is inconclusive evidence of converging outputs between our four regions.  As observed 
above, three rounds of EU regional funding have not substantially altered the ranking of our 
regions in relation to national and EU GDP averages. Rates of unemployment vary 
substantially (reflecting national labour markets and statistical data categorisation), but in 
each case economic crisis since 2008 had produced a rise in youth employment. These 
variables are captured either by descriptive statistics (adequate for our purposes), or by 
variable-based regression analysis. These heavy variables are experienced as constraints, over 
which regional policy-makers have limited control, yet are held to account by national and 
European authorities.  
Moving down a level of analysis, arguments based on hard divergence are also 
supported by structural and institutional arguments: specifically, by variable political 
opportunity structures, by the operation of party systems, by the continuing influence of 
national administrative pathways and legal traditions.   
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Prevailing political opportunity structures strongly influence the form of the party 
system in general, and of territorially specific party dynamics in particular. In three of our 
four regions (at least), the period observed a revival of territorial identity forms of collective 
action.  In Brittany, the µUHGERQQHW¶SURWHVWVRIPL[HGWHUULWRULDOLGHQWLW\PDUNHUVIODJV
language, specific practices, such as sabotage), with appeals to solidarity with a spatially 
peripheral region in crisis. In Andalucía, the reference to latifundism and land reform 
remained present in the discourse of regional leaders.  In Wales, territorial identity markers 
were expressed notably in the field of language and education. Across our four regions, 
though we identify distinct configurations of regional influence, only in Wales is the 
territorial party system is clearly influenced by a powerful ethno-territorial party, Plaid 
Cymru.  In Brittany and Andalucía, a powerful regional milieu exists: but the weight of 
territorial lobbies within the national parties or national parliamentary institutions was the 
real indicator  of regional influence. Political opportunity structures provide contrasting 
incentives in each region. This discussion emphasises that the national level of regulation 
remains important in at least three of our four cases. Except in Belgium, state structures, party 
systems and the political rules of the game still make sense nationally ± and sometimes 
regionally as well.  
Regional and local factors complete this elucidation of divergences. Place specific 
identity markers are sometimes directly comparable (Is there a regional language policy?  Do 
regionalist parties prosper?), sometimes not.  Each regional policy community operates 
within specific local traditions.  Locality effects might concern the framing of specific 
agendas and interests, such as the conflict between environmentalists and mass farming in 
Brittany, for example, or the competition for resources between metropolitan centres and 
small towns in Andalucía. They might concern issues specific to one or two regions, such as 
regional language policy (Wales) or the defence of the language more generally (Wallonia).  
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They might involve regional specificities such as the saliency of religious education in 
Brittany and Wallonia, or the hypertrophy of public sector employment in Wales and 
Andalucía.   Demographic factors are sometimes specific to particular regions or localities, 
but urban-rural movements, migration, population aging and so on are usually representative 
of broader trends.  
CONCLUSION  
 Debates around convergence and divergence need to integrate a logic of causality and a logic 
of contingency. Logics of causality can indicate the direction of change in a broad brush 
manner; our survey of four European regions indicated a trend towards a harder, normative 
Europeanisation, tighter central control over budgetary settlements and (in at least two of our 
cases) enhanced instruments of central steering. Logics of contingency involve human agency 
and place specific contexts.  Patterns of multi-level, national and sub-national governance are 
subject to sets of conditions that are contingent upon variable environmental, cognitive and 
interactional contexts.  The proposed typology encompasses these linked logics as a 
framework for understanding the material and constructed dimensions of convergence and 
divergence in a specific family of European regions labelled as second order, strong identity. 
 Processes of hard and soft convergence and divergence operate in distinctive ways 
depending upon whether inputs, outcomes, institutions, or processes are considered. 7LOO\¶V
µSDUWLDOFDXVDOLQVLJKWV¶DUHWKHPRVWFRQYLQFLQJDWWKHOHYHORILQSXWV2ur survey of four 
European regions indicated a trend towards a harder, normative Europeanisation, tighter 
central control over budgetary settlements and (in at least two of our cases) enhanced 
instruments of central steering. Comparing inputs strengthens arguments based on hard 
convergence: at the very least, the external context (the EU and other international 
organisations) weighs increasingly heavily on domestic public management and choices. The 
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direction of change is broadly similar across euro-zone countries.  The empirical evidence for 
converging outputs is more patchy, as discussed in the hard divergence section. Our  regions 
(especially Wales and Andalucía ) provided little evidence of having converged materially in 
terms of  GDP, levels of education, productivity, or youth employment.  If convergence is 
interpreted in terms of results, continuing divergence must logically be described as a failure 
to converge outcomes. The identified causal mechanism of more intrusive monitoring and 
sanctions for non-compliance does not produce mechanical effects.  Hard convergence 
arguments are the least convincing in terms of institutions; even common trends such as new 
public management appear shaped more by domestic traditions than by a genuine cross-
national template.  Institutional saliency is the key differentiating variable.  The most 
significant distinction was between the two regions caught up in a process of ongoing 
political decentralisation (Wales and Wallonia) and the French and Spanish regions, which 
appeared more directly affected by the direction of economic crisis.  Membership of the 
Eurozone also played itself out as one of the key differentiating (institutional) variables 
between our regions.   
Is there convergence to informal processes? Convergence pressures are never simply 
implemented according to a trans-national template; they require strategic and discursive 
choices that lie more squarely within the realm of human agency. The overview of our four 
regions provided little evidence of interaction-based learning, of agent-based policy transfer 
or of the emulation of foreign models.  Our survey demonstrated substantial soft 
convergence, however, in relation to the problematisation of regional priorities in a period of 
economic crisis17. Arguments of socio-economic justice were mobilised to justify continuing 
transfers: for example, the historical debt of Spain towards Andalucía; needs-based 
DUJXPHQWVLQ:DOHVWKHUHJLRQ¶VSHULSKHUDOVWDWXVLQWKHFDVHRI%ULWWDQ\WKHVHYHUH
challenges of industrial reconversion in Wallonia. In each case, playing on territorial identity 
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was a useful lever to extract resources in a context of multi-level governance (from central 
government and the European Union). In each case, the pursuit of socio-economic interests 
and preservation of existing welfare traditions and financial transfers placed boundaries on 
using territorial identity to support more autonomous forms of governance.  Ultimately, the 
social-democratic character of these regions (their preference for solidarity and cross-national 
transfers) was more important than their penchant for more autonomous forms of governance.   
Place-specific contexts (national, regional, local) are key to understanding divergence. 
Even the hardest macro-constraints can empower the belief in the capacity of specific 
territorial models to mediate economic crisis.  Regional leaders can be craftsmen of 
divergence and convergence. The ability to transform objective (macro) constraints into 
subjective (place-specific) opportunities is a measure of underlying territorial political 
capacity. The overarching claim for all of our cases, however, is that processes identified as 
those of hard convergence are reducing the domestic capacity of regional actors and 
challenging the assumptions underpinning territorial action repertoires, whether or not they 
change patterns of behaviour in the short term.  Our interviews revealed a measure of 
cognitive dissonance: the belief in the capacity of specific territorial models to negotiate 
change, alongside a broad acceptance that the levers of macro-economic policy escaped the 
control of regional decision-makers. The Breton and Andalucían cases in particular suggest 
that economic crisis embeds existing repertoires, confirming Bourdieu¶VLQVLJKWWKDW 
actors in crisis revert to existing mental maps, or habitus, even when this creates a situation 
of hysteresis, or the incapacity of existing frames to solve problems.  
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TABLE ONE 
STATES OF CONVERGENCE 
  
 Convergence Divergence 
Hard  
EU regulation, fiscal pressure, 
economic competition, ranking 
and rating 
Actors have limited choice in 
pursuing a convergent policy 
'Non-comparable' demographic, 
geographical, legal, economic 
and political regional/ locality 
factors  
Actors have limited choice in 
pursuing a divergent policy 
Soft  
Lesson drawing, policy 
learning, benchmarking, 
cognitive Europeanisation 
Actors choose to pursue a 
convergent  policy. 
µConstructed¶ divergence against 
negative models.  
Actors choose to pursue a 
divergent policy. 
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Table 2 
Regional Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Standards per inhabitant in % of 
the EU 28 average - 2011) 
 
Territory   GDP (PPS per inhabitant) 
EU28 100 
France 109 
Brittany 89 
Spain  96 
Andalucía  73 
Belgium 120 
Wallonia  
Prov. Brabant Wallon  119 
Prov. Hainaut 79 
Prov. Liège  90 
Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 81 
Prov. Namur  86 
UK 105 
Wales   
West Wales and The Valleys  64 
East Wales  91 
 
Source:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tgs000
06&plugin=1 and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pc
ode=tec00114 (last accessed 07 November 2014) 
 
 
31 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Andrews, Rhys and Steve Martin. 2010.Regional Variations in Public Service Outcomes: The 
Impact of Policy Divergence in England, Scotland and Wales. Regional Studies 44 (8): 919±
934. 
Bennett, Colin. 1991. What is Policy Convergence and What causes it? British Journal of 
Political Science 21 (3): 215±233.  
Benz, Arthur. 2007. Inter-Regional Competition in Co-operative Federalism. New Modes of 
Multi-level Governance in Germany. Regional and Federal Studies 17 (4): 421±436. 
Beyers Jan and Peter Bursens. 2013. How Europe Shapes the Nature of the Belgian 
Federation: Differentiated EU Impact Triggers Both Co-operation and Decentralization. 
Regional & Federal Studies 23 (3): 271±291. 
Borraz, Olivier. 2007. Governing Standards: The Rise of Standardisation Processes in France 
and the EU.Governance 20 (1): 57±84. 
Börzel, Tanja. 2002. States and Regions in the European Union. Institutional Adaptation in 
Germany and Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. Le sens pratique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. 
Brans, Marleen, de Visscher, Christian and Diederik Vancoppenolle. 2006.Administrative 
Reform in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernization? West European Politics 29 (4): 979±
998. 
Carter, Caitríona  and Romain Pasquier.2010.The (XURSHDQL]DWLRQRI5HJLRQVDVµ6SDFHVIRU
3ROLWLFV¶$5HVHDUFK$JHQGDRegional and Federal Studies 20 (3): 295±314. 
32 
 
Centro de investigaciones sociológicas (CIS) (2012) Barómetro autonómico III 2956. 
Madrid: CIS. 
Cole, Alistair and Romain Pasquier. 2014.  The Breton Model between Convergence and 
Capacity. Territory, Politics, Governance (DOI 10.1080/21622671.2014.977816. 
Cole, Alistair and Ian Stafford. 2015.  Devolution and Governance: Wales between capacity and 
constraint. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Cole, Alistair and Rosanne Palmer.2011. Europeanising Devolution: Wales and the European 
Union. British Politics 6 (3):379±396. 
Cole, Alistair. 2006. Beyond Devolution and Decentralisation. Building Regional Capacity in 
Wales and Brittany.  Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Cole, Alistair. 2004. Devolution and decentralization in Wales and Brittany: a framework for 
analysis. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 28 (2): 354-368. 
Colino, César. 2013.The State of Autonomies between the Economic Crisis and Enduring 
Nationalist Tensions.In Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to 
Rajoy, ed. A. Botti and B.N. Field., 81±100. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo. (2013). Relaciones exteriores de la 
economía andaluza. Seville: Junta de Andalucía. 
de Winter, Lievin. 2007. La recherche sur les identités ethno-territoriales en Belgique. Revue 
Internationale de Politique Comparée 14 (4) : 575-595.  
Delgado del Rincón, Luis. 2010. Espagne. L'équilibre entre unité et diversité : les réformes 
statutaires dans l'état des autonomies. Confluences Méditerranée 2 (73): 93-106. 
33 
 
Deschamps, Robert. 2013. Réforme du fédéralisme belge: Quelques enjeux pour la politique 
budgétaire des régions et des communautés. In La 6e réforme du fédéralisme belge et ses 
conséquences budgétaires, ed. M. Dejardin, R. Deschamps, P. Kestens, M. Mignolet and R. 
Plasman., 135±140. Bruxelles: De Boeck. 
Deschouwer, Kris and Min Reuchamps. 2013. The Belgian Federation at a Crossroad. 
Regional and Federal Studies 23 (3): 261±270.  
Dolowitz, David and David Marsh. 2000. Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy 
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance 13 (1): 5±24. 
Dyson, Kenneth. 2014. StaWHV'HEWDQG3RZHUµ6DLQWV¶DQGµ6LQQHUV¶LQ(XURSHDQ+LVWRU\
and Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Eurostat. (2012). Unemployment Rates by Region. 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics_at_
regional_level (last accessed 10 November 2014). 
Evans, Mark and Jonathan Davies. 1999. Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-level, 
Multi-Disciplinary Perspective. Public Administration 77 (2): 361±385.  
Eymeri-Douzans, Jean-Michel and Jon Pierre. ed. 2010. Administrative Reforms and 
Democratic Governance. London: Routledge. 
Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2005. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The 
Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 598: 84±101. 
Greer, Scott. 2007.The Fragile Divergence Machine: Citizenship, Policy Divergence and 
Devolution in Health Policy. In Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom, ed. 
A.Trench,136±159. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
34 
 
Hall, Peter  and Taylor, Rosemary. 1997. Les trois neo-institutionalismes. Revue française de 
science politique. 47 (3-4) : 469-496. 
Harguindéguy, Jean-Baptiste, Pasquier, Romain and Alistair Cole. 2014. Le processus 
DXWRQRPLTXHHVSDJQROjO¶pSUHXYHGHODcrise économique : vers la recentralisation ? Pouvoirs 
Locaux.  102 (3) : 3-6. 
Henderson Ailsa,  Jeffery Charlie and Wincott, Daniel. eds. 2013.  Citizenship After the 
Nation State: Regionalism, Nationalism and Public Attitudes in Europe Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Hood, Christopher. 1998. The Art of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. ed. 2001. Multi-level Governance and European 
Integration. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Keating, Michael. 2002. Devolution and public policy in the United Kingdom: divergence or 
convergence? In Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences within the UK,   eds.  J. 
Adams and P. Robinson, 3-24. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.  
Kerr, Clark. 1983.The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity?  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Knill, Christoph. 2005. Introduction: Cross-national Policy Convergence: Concepts, 
Approaches and Explanatory Factors. Journal of European Public Policy 12 (5): 764-774. 
Ladrech, Robert. 2010.Europeanisation and National Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Lascoumes, Pierre and Patrick Le Galès. ed. 2004.Gouverner par les Instruments. Paris : 
Presses de Sciences Po. 
35 
 
Lazega, Emmanuel  (2007), Des poissons et des mares : l'analyse de réseaux multi-niveaux. 
Revue française de sociologie. 48 (1) : 93-131. 
Le Coadic, Ronan. (2013). La grogne bretonne, creuset des révoltes françaises ? Quimper ne 
veut plus subir. Le Monde, 7th November.   
Le Lidec, Patrick. 2011. Décentralisation, structure du financement et jeux de transferts de 
O¶LPSRSXODULWp HQ )UDQFH ,Q Gouverner (par) les finances publiques, ed. P. Bezes and A. 
Sine, 149±192. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Anders Lidström,  ed. 2010. A Handbook of Local and 
Regional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
OECD (2013). PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity. 330pp.  
Page, Edward and Michael Goldsmith.1987. Central and Local Government Relations. 
Beverley Hills: Sage. 
Pasquier, Romain. 2004. La capacité politique des régions. Une comparaison 
France/Espagne. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. 
Pasquier, Romain. 2012.Le pouvoir régional. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.  
Piattoni, Simona. 2010. The Theory of Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
Pickernell, David. 2011. Economic Development Policy in Wales since Devolution: From 
Despair to Where? CASS Papers in Economic Geography 03/11 Cardiff: Cardiff University. 
Pollitt, Christopher. 2001.Convergence: The Useful Myth? Public Administration 79 (4): 
933±947. 
36 
 
Porras Nadales, Antonio. 1994. La administración andaluza entre modernización y 
clientelismo. Revista Catalana de Derecho Público 18: 81±91. 
Radaelli, Claudio. 2005. Diffusion without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes the 
Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment. Journal of European Public Policy 12 (5): 924±
943. 
Reid Alasdair and  Bernard Musyck. (2000). Industrial Policy in Wallonia: A Rupture with 
the Past? European Planning Studies. 8 (2): 183-200.  
Robles-Egea, Antoni and José Manuel Aceituno-Montes. 2013. Les défauts de la démocratie. 
Le clientélisme et la corruption en Andalousie. Pôle Sud  37(2): 51±74. 
Rose, Richard. 1991.What is Lesson Drawing? Journal of Public Policy 11 (1): 3±30. 
Ruíz Almendral, Violeta. 2013. The Spanish Legal Framework for Curbing the Public Debt 
and the Deficit. European Constitutional Law Review 9: 189±204. 
Sala, Gemma. 2013. Federalism without Adjectives in Spain. Publius 44 (1): 109-134. 
Schmidt, Vivien. 2011. Speaking of Change: Why Discourse is Key to the Dynamics of Policy 
Transformation. Critical Policy Studies 5 (2): 106±126. 
Simon Cosano, Pablo, Lago Peñas, Santiago and Alberto Vaquero. 2013. On the Political 
Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries: The Case of Spain. 
Publius 44 (1): 135±156. 
Steinmo, Sten. 2008. Historical Institutionalism. In Approaches and Methodologies in the 
Social Science.  eds. D. Della Porta and M. Keating. 118-38. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
37 
 
Stone, Diane. 1999. Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and 
Disciplines. Politics 19 (1): 51-9. 
Storper, Michael. 1995. The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later. European 
Urban and Regional Studies 2 (3): 191-221. 
Tilly, Charles. 2001. Mechanisms in Political Processes.  Annual Review of Political Science 
4: 21±41. 
Trench, Alan. 2013. Funding Devo More: Fiscal Options for Strengthening the Union. 
London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Tuñón, Jorge.2010. Andalucía y la Unión Europea. Actor periférico y escenario privilegiado 
de la política europea. Sevilla: Centro de Estudios Andaluces. 
Vetter, Angelika. 2010. Germany. In Changing Government Relations in Europe, ed. M.  
Goldsmith and E. Page, 88±107. London: ECPR Press.  
Zahariadis, Nikolaos.2012. Complexity, Coupling and Policy Effectiveness: the European 
Response to the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis. Journal of Public Policy 32 (2): 99±116. 
NOTES  
 
                                                          
1
  104 interviews were carried out in fieldwork from November 2012 to May 2014 in Wales, 
Brittany, Andalucía and Wallonia. In each region, the sample of interviewees included three 
groups: officials, politicians and practitioners. All interviewees were selected according to a 
territorial criterion (to include people working at the local, provincial [where appropriate] and 
regional levels) and a political criterion (to represent the left-right and centre-periphery 
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cleavages). Interviews generally lasted between 45 minutes and one hour and they were 
processed through the NVivo 10 software. 
2
 No regional figures are available for Brittany. 
3
 Information and all ILJXUHVGUDZQIURPWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRIILFLDOZHEVLWH
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/legislation/index_en.cfm (last accessed 10 
November 2014). 
4
   50% of the Bretons interviewed declared themselves to feel at least as Breton as French 
(Hendersen, 2014), a figure reaching 68.9% amongst Andalucíans (CIS, 2012). Rather as in 
Brittany, only a small minority declared an exclusively Andalucían identity  (6%), in contrast 
with much higher figures in Catalonia (34%) or the Basque Country (38%).    
5
 The second order strong identity region, as conceptualised in the article, builds upon a 
decade of published works by the authors, notably xxx and xxx (details withheld) 
6
 Debtor regions are net UHFLSLHQWVRIµVROLGDULW\¶EDVHGWUDQVIHUVfrom central government or 
richer regions for public services beyond their nominal share of GNP.  
7
  This conclusion was shared in interviews in the Wallon Regional Council and the Belgian 
central bank in January-February 2014, as part of the 24 interviews carried out in Belgium. 
8
 RQMV implies that a recommendation or a proposal of the Commission is considered 
adopted in the Council unless a qualified majority of Member States votes against it.  Under 
the reverse QMV procedure, a qualified majority will need to be mobilised to prevent 
automatic penalties in the case of not respecting the revised Stability Pact criteria.  
9
 7KHµVL[-SDFN¶UHIHUVWRILYHUHJXODWLRQVDQGRQHGLUHFWLYHDGRSWHGDVSDUWRIWKHUHIRUPRI
WKH(8¶VILVFDOJRYHUQDQFHDQGWKH6WDELOLW\DQG*URZWK3DFW6*3LQ7KHPDQ\
measures adopted included: country-specific medium-term objectives (MTO) for deficit and 
debt reduction; the requirement that general government deficits and public debt must not 
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exceed 3%  and 60% of GDP respectively or at least diminish sufficiently towards the 60% 
threshold. The Six Pack made it easier to apply the  Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) to 
Member States having breached either the deficit or the debt criterion. Financial sanctions for 
non-compliance might eventually reach 0.5% of GDP.  The Six Pack was closely associated  
with ± but separate from ± the European semester (granting the EU commission much greater 
oversight into national budgets) and the TSCG, giving a constitutional status to the golden 
rule of virtually balanced budgets.  For details see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm (last 
accessed 7th November  2014).  
10
 Interview with a member of the Belgian Public Finance Council, February 2014.  
11
 Interviewees in the Wallon region of Belgium emphasised the zeal with which performance 
indicators ZHUHSXUVXHGLQWKHUHJLRQ¶V0DUVKDOO3ODQSHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUVZHUHUHYLVHG
and monitored on a three-month basis.  
12
 Interview with the Welsh Education minister in 2002.  
13
 Identical questions were asked in each region in relation to the existence (or not) of  a  
regional political culture, the role of parties, intergovernmental relations  and the impact of 
European integration on regional cohesion.  
14
 The main themes emerging in response to the question on Andalucían political culture. 
15
 16 interviews were carried out with a specially convened civil service panel in 2010, 
following up from earlier interviews carried out in 2001-2002. 
16
  Most interviewees in the 2010 civil service panel refused to be drawn on this, but a couple 
regretted the obstacles to identifying good practice in England. 
17
  This analysis is substantiated from data derived from the common question inviting 
interlocutors to identify the main policy challenges over the next five years.  
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